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ABSTRACT
Relative to their counterparts in high-income regions, entrepreneurs in developing countries face less
efficient financial markets, more volatile macroeconomic conditions, and higher entry costs. This paper
develops a dynamic empirical model that links these features of the business environment to cross-firm
productivity distributions, entrepreneurs’ welfare, and patterns of industrial evolution. Applied to panel
data on Colombian apparel producers, the model yields econometric estimates of a credit market imperfection
index, the sunk costs of creating a new business, and a risk aversion index (inter alia). Model-based
counterfactual experiments suggest that improved intermediation could dramatically increase the return
on assets for entrepreneurial households with modest wealth, and that the gains are particularly large
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I.  Overview 
Relative  to  their  counterparts  in  high-income  regions,  entrepreneurs  in  developing 
countries  face  less  efficient  financial  markets,  more  volatile  macroeconomic  conditions,  and 
higher entry costs.
1,2, 3 This paper develops a dynamic empirical model that links these features 
of  the  business  environment  to  firm  ownership  patterns,  firm  size  distributions,  productivity 
distributions, and borrowing patterns.    
The  model  emphasizes  several  basic  effects.  First,  borrowing  constraints  force 
households with modest collateral to either forego profitable entrepreneurial activities or pursue 
them on an inefficiently small scale. Second, since credit constraints limit households’ ability to 
smooth their consumption streams, those with relatively less tolerance for risk shy away from 
business ventures during periods of macro volatility.
 4 Finally, in combination with substantial 
entry  costs  and a significant  spread between borrowing and lending rates,  uncertainty about 
future business conditions creates an incentive for entrepreneurs to continue operating firms that 
generate  sub-market  returns.  Combined,  these  effects  make  firms’  survival  and  growth  less 
dependent upon their owners’ entrepreneurial ability, and more dependent upon their owners’ 
                                                 
1 Private credit is scarce (as a share of GDP), spreads between borrowing and lending rates are large, non-bank 
intermediation is relatively unimportant, and equity markets are often almost non-existent. The literature 
documenting these patterns of financial development  is vast;  Beck et al (2000) provide a cross-country data set that 
reflect the characteristics mentioned here. Levine (2005) surveys the evidence linking these features of financial 
sectors (among others) to countries’ aggregate growth rates.  Djankov et al (2006) empirically link the poor 
performance of credit markets in developing countries to their lack of legal creditor protections and information-
sharing institutions. 
 
2 Loayza et al (2007) survey the literature on macroeconomic volatility in developing countries and discuss its 
causes and costs.  Kaminsky and Reinhardt (1999) document patterns of banking and financial crises in developing 
countries. Tybout (2000)  provides additional references and notes that Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa stand 
out among the developing countries as the most volatile, but all developing regions do worse than the industrialized 
countries. 
 
3 Surveying entry regulations in 85 countries, Djankov et al (2002) conclude that ― business entry is extremely 
expensive, especially in the countries outside the top quartile of the income distribution.‖ (p. 25)  
 
4 Volatility can also change the types of capital goods that entrepreneurs invest in, as in Lambson (1991) and 
Aghion, et al (2005). Our analysis does not deal with this phenomenon. 
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wealth and market-wide volatility. 
We fit our model to plant-level panel data and macro data from Colombia, obtaining 
econometric estimates of plant-level profit functions, the sunk cost of creating a new business, 
and an index of credit market imperfections (inter alia). Then, using our estimated parameters, 
we  simulate  industrial  evolution  patterns  under  alternative  assumptions  about  credit  market 
imperfections. In particular, we explore the effects of credit market imperfections and volatile 
macro environments on entry and exit patterns, cross-firm investment patterns, industry-wide 
productivity distributions, and savings. 
  The simulations yield a number of findings. First, the credit markets in which small-scale 
Colombian entrepreneurs operate are subject to severe contract enforcement problems. These 
problems interact with macro volatility, substantial entry costs, and risk aversion to discourage 
households with modest wealth from investing in proprietorships—even those with high earnings 
potential.  Second,  if  enforcement  problems  were  eliminated  so  that  entrepreneurs  were  less 
dependent upon self-finance, those with relatively modest wealth but high earnings potential 
would  expand  their  businesses  significantly  relative  to  others.  Also,  the  option  value  of 
remaining in business would fall for firms with low earnings rates, and some of these would exit. 
Combined,  these  two  effects  would  increase  the  industry-wide  overall  rate  of  return  on  the 
wealth portfolios of entrepreneurs by 2 percentage points and reduce the correlation between 
entrepreneurs’ personal wealth and the size of their firms from 0.81 to 0.51.  Third, the gains 
from  better  contract  enforceability  are  concentrated  among  entrepreneurial  households  with 
promising business opportunities and modest wealth, many of whom would see the returns on 
their asset portfolios more than double under perfect enforceability.Fourth, since debt allows 
entrepreneurs to smooth consumption and quickly react to business conditions,  credit market 4 
 
imperfections are more costly in more volatile macro environments. Finally, if Colombia were to 
reduce the spread between its borrowing rate and its lending rate, wealthy households would 
shift their portfolios away from businesses investments toward the financial sector, increasing 
the average return on wealth portfolios by 8 to 25 percentage points. 
  Our study is distinctive in that we econometrically estimate a dynamic structural model 
of entrepreneurship with uncertainty and endogenous borrowing constraints. However, it shares a 
focus on entrepreneurship, borrowing constraints and wealth heterogeneity with a number of 
dynamic general equilibrium models, including Banerjee and Newman (1993, 2001), Aghion and 
Bolton (1997), Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000), Giné and Townsend (2004), and Cagetti and 
De Nardi (2006).  And it resembles Townsend and Ueda (2006) and Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990) in that it characterizes the choices of risk-averse households between a risky business 
venture that is subject to idiosyncratic shocks and a financial asset that is subject only to market-
wide shocks. 
The model we develop is also consonant with many of the main messages that emerge 
from the micro empirical literature on entrepreneurship and credit market imperfections. These 
include findings that small scale entrepreneurs in developing countries are credit-constrained 
(Del Mel et al, 2007; Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Paulson and Townsend, 2004), that wealthy 
households are more likely to own businesses (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 
1989;  Fairlie,  1999;  Quadrini,  1999;  Gentry  and  Hubbard,  2004;  Hurst  and  Lusardi,  2004; 
Cagetti and de Nardi, 2006), and that the correlation between wealth and entrepreneurship partly 
reflects lower absolute risk aversion among the wealthy (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). 
Finally, our paper is related to several empirical models of industry dynamics. These 
include Cooley and Quadrini’s (2001) model of risk-neutral firms’ investment behavior with 5 
 
credit constraints  (based on costly state verification),  Bloom’s  (2009)  model of firms’ input 
choices in the face of convex adjustment costs and uncertainty, and Buera’s (2008) deterministic 
model of entrepreneurial behavior subject to a leverage constraint.  
 
II.    The Model  
Several basic assumptions underpin our model. First, securities markets are negligible 
and households must hold their wealth as bank deposits and/or investments in proprietorships.  
Second, households can borrow to finance some of their business investments, but their loans 
must  be  sufficiently  small  that  they  consider  default  less  profitable  than  repayment.  Third, 
households  are  forward-looking,  infinitely-lived,  and  risk-averse.  Fourth,  households  are 
heterogeneous in terms of their ability to generate business income, which is subject to serially 
correlated, idiosyncratic shocks. Fifth, all firms produce traded goods, so changes in the real 
exchange rate result in changes in demand for their output. Finally, exchange rates and interest 
rates evolve jointly according to an exogenous Markov process. We now turn to specifics. 
A.  The Macro Environment  
Three macro variables appear in our model: the real exchange rate, e, the real lending 
rate, r, and the real deposit rate, r – μ. The interest spread  0    is parametrically fixed, so we 











s  , 
which we assume evolves according to an exogenous Markov process:  ) | ( 1 t t s s   .   
B.  The Household Optimization Problem  
Households fall into one of three categories: incumbent owner-households (I), potential 
owner-households (P), and non-entrepreneurial households (N).  Incumbent owner-households 6 
 
currently own firms, and must decide each period whether to continue to operating them or exit. 
Those that exit become non-entrepreneurial households; those that remain in the industry must 
further choose their output levels, capital stocks, and debt/equity ratios, subject to borrowing 
constraints.   
Potential owner households  are not  currently in the industry, but  do  have  ― ideas‖ of 
various qualities on which they could base new firms.   After assessing the potential earnings 
streams associated with their ideas, these households decide whether to create a firm in the 
current  period  by  paying  a  sunk  entry  cost  and  initiating  production.    Non-entrepreneurial 
households do not currently operate a firm or have a business idea, so they need only make a 
consumption/saving  decision  in  the  current  period.  (They  hold  all  of  their  wealth  as  bank 
deposits,  and  since  the  deposit  rate  is  less  than  the  lending  rate,  they  have  no  incentive  to 
borrow.) Next period, however, they may be struck with a new idea and become a potential 
entrant—this  happens  with  exogenously  given  probability.  Possible  transitions  between  the 
household types are summarized by figure 1. 
All  households  are  characterized  by  a  constant  relative  risk  aversion  (CRRA)  utility 












c U , where  it c  is consumption by household i at time t.  Each period, 
households choose their savings rates, next-period types (if they are incumbent- or potential-
owners), and business investments (if they are incumbent-owners). They make these decisions 
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subject to borrowing constraints. (Here Et is an expectations operator conditioned on information 
available  in  period  t,  and   is  a  discount  factor  that  reflects  the  rate  of  time  preference.) 
Outcomes are uncertain because the macro economy evolves stochastically, and because owner-7 
 
households experience idiosyncratic shocks to the return on their business investments. 
 
Non-entrepreneurial households  
The optimization problem faced by non-entrepreneurial households is the simplest, since 
these households only decide how to allocate their current income between consumption and 
savings.  Let  it a  denote the wealth held by household i at the beginning of period t, and let its 
exogenous non-asset income be y. Consumption by non-entrepreneurial household i in period t is 
  ) ( 1 it it it t it a a a r y c         .  In the following period, the household becomes a potential 
entrant household with probability p.   
In period t, non-entrepreneurial household i maximizes the expected present value of its 
utility stream by choosing its savings rate  it a a   .  The resulting expected present value of its 
utility stream is    
  
  ) ' , ' ( ) 1 ( ) ' , ' ( ) | ' (
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Here V
P (a, s) is the value function for a potential entrant household (discussed below), and the 
constraint  ' a   0 reflects our assumption that households are unable to borrow against their non-
asset income.   
  Incumbent owner households 
  Owner-households face a more involved optimization problem because they must  
choose whether to continue operating their proprietorships andgiven that they continuehow 
much of their wealth to hold as investments in their firms. The business income (before fixed 
costs and interest payments) generated by household i’s proprietorship is:  8 
 
 
  it t it e k   , , ,  , 0 , 0   kk k     , 0  e     0    ,      (2) 
 
where   it k  is the firm’s stock of productive assets and it is an idiosyncratic shock that captures 
managerial  skills  and investment  opportunities. We assume that it  evolves  according to  the 
discrete Markov process  ) | ( 1 it it      and that it is independent of the macroeconomic state 
vector st.   
Several features of the function (2) merit comment. First, business income is decreasing 
in e because we treat an increase in the exchange rate as an appreciation, which intensifies 
import competition and reduces the return to exporting. Second, firms’ incomes are not affected 
by the behavior of their domestic competitors because we assume that each firm’s product has 
many substitutes in foreign markets, making the effects of entry, exit or price adjustments by 
domestic  producers  insignificant.  Finally,  diminishing  returns  to  productive  assets,  0  kk  , 
reflect finite demand elasticities for each product, and may capture span-of-control effects as 
well.  
Owner-households can invest all of, more than, or less than their entire wealth in their 
business’s asset stock. If household i invests all of its wealth in its firm and borrows nothing, 
it it k a  . If it invests less than all of its wealth, it holds the balance  it it k a   as bank deposits, 
which yield    t r . If it invests more than its wealth, it must satisfy the no-default constraint (to 
be discussed), and it  finances  the excess  it it a k    with  a loan at  rate  t r .
5  Combining these 
possibilities, the i
th household earns or pays out     it t it it D r k a      in interest during period t, 
where    0 1    it it it k a D   is  a  dummy  variable  indicating  whether  households  hold  bank 
                                                 
5 Households never borrow to acquire bank deposits because, with   > 0, this amounts to giving money away to the 
bank. 9 
 
deposits.    Accordingly,  its  period  t  consumption  is      f e k y c it t it it ) , , (  
  ) ( ) ( 1 it it it it it t a a k a D r        , where f is the per-period fixed cost of operating a business. 
Given the above, the expected present  value of owner-household  i’s utility stream  is 
determined by its beginning-of-period wealth, it a , its idiosyncratic profitability shock,  it  , and 
the macroeconomic state, st .  If the household sells off its productive assets, pays off its debts, 
and shuts down its firm, it reaps the expected utility stream of a non-entrepreneur,  ) , ( it it
N s a V . 
Alternatively, if it continues to operate, it reaps current utility 
 
    ) ( ) ( ) , , ( 1 it it it it it t it t it a a k a D r f e k y U              
 
and  it  retains  the  option  to  continue  producing  next  period  without  incurring  entry  costs. 
Accordingly,  the  unconditional  expected  utility  stream  for  an  owner-household  in  state 
  it t it s a  , ,  when the firm is able to borrow as much as it wants at rate rt to finance its capital 
investment is:  
  ) , ( ), , , (
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Owner-households face a borrowing constraint, however, so they may not be able to attain 
the expected utility levels described by (1) - (4). Specifically, their choices of a’ and k must 10 
 
satisfy:  





I s k V s a V     ,                (5) 
 
where  ] 1 , 0 [    is the fraction of their assets that owner-households are able to keep in the event 
that they default. This constraint—which appears in Banerjee and Newman (1993, 2001) and 
Cagetti  and  De  Nardi  (2006),  among  others—follows  from  the  assumption  that    lenders  are 
perfectly informed about the current profitability of household i’s firm, it  , but they are unable to 
observe the uses to which household i puts its loans. It states that defaulting owner-households, 
whose welfare matches that of a non-entrepreneurial household with assets  it k  , do worse that 
owner households in the same  ) , , ( it t it s a   state who continue to operate their businesses and pay 
their  debts.
  6  The  limiting  cases  of  0     and  1   correspond  to  perfectly  enforceable  debt 
contracts and costless default, respectively. We interpret    to capture all of the monetary and 
psychic costs of defaulting, including possible punishments.  
This formulation captures two senses in which household wealth accumulation leads to 
business financing. First, wealthy households satisfy (5) at higher borrowing (kit – ait ) levels 
because  they  stand  to  lose  more  in  the  event  of  default.  That  is,  household  wealth  acts  as 
collateral. Second, when  it it k a   , the wedge  between the borrowing and lending rate makes 
business assets more attractive than bank deposits as a use for new savings. 
  Potential owner-households    
  We conclude our description of our model by characterizing industry entry.  Each period, 
an exogenous number of households develop new business ideas and become potential owner-
                                                 
6 Borrowing constraints of this type allow one to characterize contract enforceability problems without introducing 
costly state verification. They thus make numerical solution of the model relatively quick, and thereby facilitate 
econometric estimation.  11 
 
households. Households’ ideas determine their initial profit shocks, which are independent and 
identically distributed across potential-owners according to the density q0(ν).  
Taking stock of its particular ν draw, each household decides whether to create a new firm 
by  paying  start-up  costs,  F,  and  purchasing  an  initial  capital  stock  it k .
7  At  the  same  time, 
household that create new firms choose their savings levels,  it a a   , subject to the relevant no-
default constraint.  The return to entry when savings and capital stocks are chosen optimally, 
given the household's productivity draw is 
 
subject to 
) , ( ) , , (
~
t s it k N V it t s it a P V                  (6) 
Potential entrant households that choose not to enter return to being non-entrepreneurial 
households and allocate their current income of y + (rt -µ)ait between consumption and asset 
accumulation in the form of bank deposits. The window for exploiting their particular idea closes, 
and  the  quality  of  their  future  business  ideas  is  independent  of  their  current  ν.  Accordingly, 
potential entrant households create new proprietorships when    





P s a V s a V            (7) 
Note that they might choose not to enter for two reasons.  One is that the current (s, ν) realization 
makes entry unattractive.  The other is low initial wealth holdings.   
                                                 
7 In the previous version of this paper we assumed that entrepreneurs did not learn their productivity until they had 
paid the cost of creating a new firm. We switched to the current specification because it generates selection on 
profitability at the entry margin, which seems more realistic. Also, since it increases the set of firms with high 
productivity and low assets, it creates a larger role for credit constraints. 
 
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The expected value of being a potential entrant, prior to drawing its productivity level, is   
 

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P s a V s a V s a V       (8) 
where  φ
P(ν)  is  the  density  function  for  a  initial  profit  shocks  .  Since  a  non-entrepreneurial 
household has a probability p of having an idea and becoming a potential entrant, the expected 
return in (8) enters the return to a non-entrepreneurial household in (1).   
In the absence of borrowing constraints, the functional equations (1), (4), (6), and (7) are 
a contraction mapping that yield unique solutions V
N*, V
P* and V
I* for the value functions of the 
respective household types with perfect capital markets. When the borrowing constraint (5) is 
imposed,  however,  the  functional  equations  are  no  longer  a  contraction  because  the  value 
functions appear in the constraint. Multiple equilibria can arise because beliefs may be self-
fulfilling: the expectation of a low value for the firm will make the no default constraint more 
binding,  and  will  reduce  the  amount  the  firm  can  borrow.    To  deal  with  this  potential 
multiplicity, we first solve this problem for the case of perfect capital markets. We then use the 
first best value functions (V
N*, V
P*, V
I*), as starting points for value function iteration of the 
system where the borrowing constraint is imposed. The limit of this sequence is a solution to this 
optimization  problem.    We  also  verified  that  this  solution  yields  the  highest  payoff  to 
entrepreneurs, given the equilibrium payoff to non-entrepreneurial households.
8  
                                                 
8 Rustichini (1998) examines a class of incentive constrained dynamic programming problems where the sequence 
of value functions generated by this procedure is non-increasing, and shows that the limit of this sequence is the 
solution to the dynamic programming problem with the highest payoff.  In our problem, it is not guaranteed that the 
sequence of value functions will be non-increasing because the value functions appear on both sides of the incentive 
constraint in (5).  To address this concern, we took a two stage approach.   In the first stage, we did a value function 
iteration for the household payoff functions starting from the first best value functions. This process converged to  
value functions that we denote     
     
     
  .  In the second stage, we repeated the process from the first stage, but 
using the fixed payoff function    
   to calculate the payoff to a deviating entrepreneur who does not repay the loan 
(on the right hand of (5)). Since this payoff function is constant throughout the iterative process, the sequence of 
value functions in the second stage will be non-increasing.  The limit of the sequence of value functions in the 
second stage, which we denote     
    
    
  ,  represent the highest payoff attainable to households when    
   is the 
deviation payoff.  If     
       
  for j = (N, P, I), then our first stage value functions represent payoff that are not 13 
 
 
C.    Industry Evolution
 
  The solution to the owner-household optimization problem (3)-(5) yields a policy function 
) , , ( ~
it t it s a a  for  incumbent  households’  asset  accumulation,  and  an  indicator  function 
) , , ( it t it s a    that is equal to one for those households that sell their businesses.  Similarly, the 
solution  to  the  potential  entrepreneur’s  optimization  problem  (6)-(7)  yields  a  policy  function 
) , ( ~
t it
P s a a for  potential  owner-households’  asset  accumulation  and  an  indicator  function 
) , ( t it
N s a    that is  equal  to one for those potential-owner households that create new firms.  
Once the model’s parameters have been estimated, these policy functions provide the basis for 
simulations discussed in section IV below.   
 
III.  Fitting the model to data 
Our  estimation  strategy  is  dictated  partly  by  data  availability.  Matched  employer-
employee data are generally not available in developing countries, and the household surveys 
that  do  exist  are  not  very  informative  about  the  businesses  that  entrepreneurial  households 
operate. We therefore estimate our model using macro time series and plant-level panel data.  
More  precisely,  we  fit  our  model  to  macro  data  and  micro  panel  data  on  apparel 
producers  in  Colombia.  The  Colombian  macro  environment  suits  our  purposes  because  it 
exhibited major changes in real exchange rates and real interest rates during the past 25 years, 
and  thus  should  have  induced  the  type  of  variation  in  behavior  that  is  needed  to  identify 
parameters. The Colombian regulatory environment suits our purposes because creditors have 
                                                                                                                                                             
Pareto dominated by any other equilibrium payoff.  In our case, the first and second stage solutions differed by 
           
             
                 
     
          
  = 7.022e-9 which is lower than our tolerance value 1e-8. 14 
 
limited rights to seize collateral in this country, and bureaucratic barriers to entry are substantial.
9 
Finally, the apparel industry suits our purposes because apparel is highly tradable and because its 
minimum efficient scale is relatively low. Tradability is necessary if prices are to be determined 
in global markets, as the model presumes, and modest scale economies are necessary to ensure 
monopolistic competition and large numbers of closely-held firms.   
A.   Estimating the Markov process for macro variables 
To estimate the joint transition density for interest rates and exchange rates,  ) | ( 1 t t s s   , 
we use the longest quarterly st series available, which spans the period 1982I through 2007II. As 
figure 2 demonstrates, this period began with several years of low interest rates and a strong 
peso; thereafter, the exchange rate regime collapsed, triggering a major devaluation and a sharp 
increase in interest rates.
10  During the ensuing post-collapse period the exchange rate gradually 
regained strength. But shortly into the new century the peso lost value and interest rates appeared 
to realign once again.  
These  trajectories  suggest  that  a  regime-switching  model  might  do  a  good  job  of 
approximating the transition density,  ) | ( 1 t t s s   . Such models presume that the time series of 
interest obeys different vector autoregressions (VARs) at different points in time, with switches 
                                                 
9 The World Bank (2008) gives Colombia a score of 2 on a 10-point scale for the strength of the legal rights enjoyed 
by its creditors. Out of 178 economies, including 24 OECD ― benchmark countries,‖ this study ranks Colombia  84
th 
in terms of credit access.  In terms of  ― ease of starting a business‖ it ranks Colombia 88
th in the world. More 
specifically, the Bank reports that ― it requires 11 procedures, takes 42 days, and costs 19.32 percent of GNI per 
capita to start a business in Colombia.‖ (p. 10).  
 
10Kaminsky and  Reinhart (1999) document similar patterns in their study of  20 crisis-prone countries: periods of 
appreciation and low interest rates are followed by periods of depreciation with higher interest rates. In the 
Colombian context, the major changes in the macro environment reflected associated changes in global coffee 
prices, global oil prices, international credit conditions, and Colombian policy decisions. For descriptions of these 
shocks and the associated policy responses, see Edwards (2001), Garcia and Jayasuriya (1997), and Partow  (2003).  
 15 
 
between the VARs governed by a function to be estimated.
 11  Some switching models treat the 
probabilities of regime changes as exogenous, some treat these probabilities as a function of 
exogenous variables, and some treat regime changes as triggered by the movement of an element 
of the VAR across a threshold.
 We opt for the latter type of model, known as a ― self-exciting 
threshold autoregression‖ (SETAR), because it allows the probability of a regime change to build 
when macro conditions are unsustainable, as for example, when exchange rate policy leads to an 
increasingly strong currency. Also, unlike the second type of switching mentioned above, the 
SETAR model allows the triggering variable itself to switch processes.  
To  implement  the  SETAR  model,  we  assume  the  economy  is  in  one  of  two  macro 














  .  Regime switches are triggered when one of 
the elements of the vector sthe interest rate, in our casecrosses an estimated threshold value.  
Estimates of this specification are reported in Table 2. They imply that the economy is regime 1 
when the real interest rate is below 0.125 (12.5 percent), and in regime 2 otherwise. Also, the 
point estimates imply stable processes for in both regimes, but real interest rates are substantially 
higher in the second regime, and the peso tends to be weaker.
  12  Finally, simulations of the 
estimated SETAR show that the unconditional variance of the exchange rate process is higher in 
regime 1, while the unconditional variance of the interest rate process is roughly the same in both 
                                                 
11 Applications of regime-switching models to exchange rates include Engel and Hamilton (1990) and Bollen, et al 
(2000). Applications to interest rate processes include Gray (1996). We are unaware of papers that apply switching 
estimators to the joint evolution of exchange rates and interest rates, although Chen (2006) estimates an exchange 
rate switching model in which the interest rate affects the probability of a regime switch but does not enter the VAR 
directly. The methodology for estimating multivariate switching models is nonetheless well developed (e.g., Clarida 
et al, 2003).  
 
12 We have not performed unit root tests. Caner and Hansen (2001) develop unit root tests for univariate threshold 
autoregressions, but we are unaware of tests for the case of vector autoregressions.  16 
 
regimes.  Thus, other things  equal,  risk  aversion  and  reliance on business  income  will make 
households  prefer  regime  2,  while  indebtedness  will  make  households  prefer  regime  1.  We 
examine the question of which effect dominates for different types of households in section IV 
below.   
It remains to estimate the spread between the lending rate and the deposit rate, . We 
identify this parameter as the mean difference between these two series over the sample period:  
= 0.060. This figure is not unusual for Latin American economies, but it is several percentage 
points higher than the spreads typically found in high-income countries (Beck et al, 2000). 
B.        Estimating the profit function 
To obtain estimates of the operating profits function,    it t it e k   , , , and the transition 
density  for  profit  shocks, ) | ( 1 it it f    ,  it  is  necessary  to  impose  additional  structure  on  the 
model.  First,  let  the production function for firm  i  be   
it it it it l k u Q   ) exp( , where  it Q   is 
physical output,  it u  is a productivity index and lit is an index of variable input usagelabor, 
intermediates, and energy. Next, assume that each firm sells a single differentiated product in the 
global marketplace, where it faces a demand function of the form     it it
d
it p A Q . Here  1    is 
the  elasticity  of  demand,  and  it A ,  which  is  exogenous  from  the  perspective  of  individual 
producers, collects all market-wide and idiosyncratic forces that shift demand for the i
th firm’s 
product.
13 Finally, let the i
th firm face exogenous price wit for a unit bundle of variable inputs, 
and assume that it chooses the associated profit-maximizing quantity and output price.  
Given these assumptions, total revenue ( it G ) and total variable cost ( it C ) are: 
                                                 
13 This characterization of demand is consistent with CES preferences over product varieties, frictionless trade, and 
the assumption that each firm supplies an insignificant fraction of the global apparel market. 
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 . Conveniently, productivity shocks ( it u ), the demand 
shifter ( it A ), variable factor prices ( it w ), and capital stocks ( it k ) enter (9a) and (9b) in the same 
way, so cross-equation restrictions help to identify parameters, and the ratio of variable costs to 
revenues is simply   < 1.  
Since  the  demand  shifter,  the  productivity  shock,  and  the  factor  price  index  are 
unobservable at the firm level, we treat     

 / ) 1 ( / 1 ) 1 (










A  as a Cobb-Douglas 
function of the real exchange rate and serially correlated firm-specific shocks. Further, to allow 
for discrepancies between book values and true values,  we  assume that the log of observed 
variable production costs ( m C ln ) differs from the log of ― true‖ costs (ln C) by the measurement 
error c  .
14  Then, defining  ) , ( it t a s   to be the minimum profit shock at which a firm continues 
operating (as implied by the dynamic programming problem in section II above), the following 
system of equations provides a basis for identification of profit function parameters and the 
transition density ) | ( 1 it it f    : 
it it t it k e G         ln ln ln 2 1 0          (10a) 
 
                                                 
14 Among other things, this discrepancy reflects the fact that some wages are overhead expenses rather than variable 
production costs, inventory accounting does not accurately reflect the opportunity cost of inputs, and some costs that 
are recorded as overhead may vary with production levels. Since sales revenue (G) is straightforward to record and 
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)] , ( [ 1 it t it it a s                   (10d) 
 
 
Here ) , 0 ( ~ 2
   N it , and  ) , 0 ( ~ 2
C N c
it     are assumed to be independent, serially uncorrelated 
shocks. Note that by equations (10a) and (10b), true operating profits before interest payments 
may be written as: 
  it t it e k   , ,  =      it it it t o k k e     
     
2 ln exp ) 1 ( 1 , 
     
where δ is the rate of depreciation.
 
Selection bias and simultaneity bias complicate estimation of the parameters in (10a)-
(10d). The former problem arises because firms that draw very low productivity shocks shut 
down  (by  10d),  and  the  shutdown  point  is  different  for  entrepreneurs  with  different  asset 
stocks.
15 The latter problem arises because current period capital stocks are chosen after the 
current period productivity shock is observed.
16 We develop a moments-based estimator related 
to Olley and Pakes (1996) that deals with both problems. Details are provided in appendix 1. 
Table 1 reports estimates of the profit function, the transition density ) | ( 1 it it f    , and 
the rate of depreciation, δ.  The profit function and transition estimates are obtained by fitting the 
system  (10a-d)  to  data  on  the  population  of  apparel  producers  appearing  in  the  annual 
manufacturing  survey  for  a  least  two  consecutive  years  between  1981  and  1991.  The 
                                                 
15 Big firms continue operating at relatively low  it   values because the difference between firms’ continuation 
values and their scrap values is increasing in  it   and  it k  (Olley and Pakes, 1996).  
 
16 This is true in Olley and Pakes (1996) as well, but they assume that output is a function of previous period capital 
stocks, so they do not need to deal with this type of simultaneity bias. 
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depreciation rate is constructed as the simple average across all observations on active firms of 
current depreciation expenses to capital stocks.    
The estimates are generally quite plausible. At 0.61, capital’s marginal revenue product is 
substantial,  but  it implies  diminishing returns to  capital  investment—either because of finite 
demand  elasticities  in  product  markets  or  span  of  control  problems.
17  The  exchange  rate 
coefficient implies each percentage point of appreciation reduces earnings, costs and profits by 
about  0.37  percent  points.  Plant-specific  profitability  shocks  exhibit  strong  serial 
correlationthe  root  of  this  process  is  around  0.90,  and  is  highly  significant.    Finally,  the 
difference between the revenue function intercept and the cost function intercept implies that 
firms keep about 20 cents of each dollar of revenue as gross operating profit. 
 
C.  Estimating the remaining parameters 
Estimation strategy 
A number of parameters remain to be estimated. These include the sunk entry cost, F, the 
per-period fixed operating cost, f, the credit market imperfection index, , the probability that a 
former entrepreneur encounters a new business opportunity, p, the risk aversion parameter, σ, 
exogenous household income, y, the average log wealth among new entrepreneurial households, 
0 a , the variance in wealth among new entrepreneurial households, 
2
0 a  , and the ratio of total 
productive assets to fixed capital, .
18 These parameters, hereafter collectively referenced as  = 
                                                 
17 Since Bloom (2009) assumes constant returns to scale and a mark-up of 0.33, the elasticity of revenue with respect 
to scale in his model is approximately 0.75. Calibrating to U.S. data spanning all forms of  business, and assuming 
competitive product markets, Cagetti and Di Nardi (2006) estimate the elasticity of output or revenue with respect to 
scale at 0.88. 
 
18  We express asset stocks in logs to better deal with skewness. The parameter  is included in  because our survey 
data only report fixed capital stocks, while conceptually, k includes all productive assets. 
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(F, f,  , p, σ, y,  0 a , 
2
0 a  , ), are estimated using the simulated method of moments.
19 
The logic behind the estimator is as follows. Taking    it t it e k   , , ,  ) | ( 1 it it f     and 
) , | , ( 1 1 t t t t r e r e     as given, one can numerically solve the optimization problem in section II at 
any feasible  value.  Then, using the resulting policy functions, one can simulate the cross-firm 
distribution of capital, profits, productivity, and debt for the apparel sector as it evolves through 
time.
 Defining m() to be a vector of moments that summarizes these joint distributions and their 
evolution,  the  discrepancy  between  these  simulated  moments  and  their  sample-based 
counterparts,  m ,  can  be  can  measured  as     ) (       ) ( ) (      m m W m m ,  where  W  =
    
1
) ( ) (
      m m m m E   is the efficient weighting matrix. Our estimator is     = arg min
) (  . Defining Ω as the variance-covariance matrix of the data moments, we construct the 
efficient weighting matrix as W=[(1+1/S)Ω]
-1 where S denotes the number of simulations.
20  
Several issues arise in simulating m(). First, we must discretize the state space involved 
in order to use standard solution techniques for solving firms’ dynamic optimization problems. 
For the macro variables and the profit shocks, which are jointly normally distributed, we apply 
Tauchen and Hussey’s (1991) quadrature rules to the estimated transition densities.
21 For capital 
stocks and asset values, we create a discrete grid based on observed distributions.
22 Second, we 
                                                 
19 The discount factor   is fixed exogenously using the average interest rate implied by the SETAR process:   = 
1/(1+0.142) = 0.875.   
 
20 The first term in W represents the randomness in the actual data and the second term represents randomness 
coming from the simulated data. Ω is calculated by block bootstrapping the actual data with replacement. We use 
S=50 with each of these panels of firms having independent draw of macro shocks. Lee and Ingram (1991) show 
variance-covariance matrix of simulated moments is (1/S)* Ω under the estimating null hypothesis. 
 
21In the case of macro variables, we also must convert quarterly transition probabilities to annual transition 
probabilities by compounding the former. 
 
22 We used 75 discrete points for each of capital and asset values. To make the model solve quickly enough for 21 
 
need an algorithm for finding  ) ( min arg   .  The function  ) (   is neither smooth nor concave, 
so  gradient-based  algorithms  fail  to  identify  global  minima.  We  therefore  use  simulated 
annealing, repeated using different initial values to ensure robustness. Third, we must construct 
an initial cross-household distribution for the profitability shocks,  it  . We base this distribution 
on the steady state distribution for the profitability shocks from our estimated of profit function. 
Fourth, since the data set does not report firms’ borrowing levels, we must impute total debt for 
each observation. We do so using total interest payments (which are reported) divided by the 
market lending rate.  Finally, it is necessary to make some assumptions about the number of 
households that might potentially start new apparel firms in each period. We assume that in the 
initial period there are 300 owner-households and we assume that 250 new households appear in 
the population of potential entrepreneurs each period. These figures essentially serve to fix the 
number of active firms.
23  
We  use  23 moments  of  general  industry  characteristics  to  estimate  .  These  include 
moments  of  the  distribution  of  capital  among  entrants,  aiming  to  identify  entry  costs  and 
entrants’  asset  distribution  parameters;  moments  that  characterize  cross-firm  distribution  of 
debts; inter-temporal and cross-firm covariances, aiming to identify utility (risk aversion) and 
                                                                                                                                                             
econometric estimation, we use 10 discrete points for exchange rate, 10 for interest rate and 6 for profit shocks. 
There is a little sensitivity in the solution to the capital and asset discretization, but qualitatively the solution does 
not change.  
 
23 Let I0 be the number of owner-households in period 0, and let N be the number of new households we add to the 
population each period. Then if the fraction of new households that creates firms is e and the fraction of owner-
















) 1 ( 1
) 1 ( 0 . Thus, with stable rates of entry and exit, the current population approaches eN/x  
as       , and the size of the initial population becomes irrelevant. Similarly, the asymptotic entry rate and exit rate 
depend only on e and x. Experiments show that, holding other parameters fixed, variations in the number of new 




credit  market  imperfection  parameters;  entry  and  exit  rate  moments;  and  moments  of  the 




Table 3 reports  estimates in the upper panel; the simulated moments that they imply are 
juxtaposed with corresponding data-based moments in the lower panel. Overall, the model does a 
good job of replicating the main  features of our panel of apparel firms, including their size 
distribution,  profit  distribution,  entry  and  exit  rates,  and  borrowing  patterns.  All  of  the  23 
simulated moments except for two have the same sign as their sample counterparts, and most are 
close in magnitude.  
Turning to the key parameters, sunk entry costs amount to 168,713 in 1977 Colombian 
pesos, or $10,243 in current US dollars.
 24 This figure is equivalent to13 percent of the value of 
the  fixed  capital  stock  for  a  firm  of  average  size.  Entry  costs  reflect  the  bureaucratic  costs 
associated with creating a new firm, capital installation and removal costs, and any customizing 
of  equipment  and  facilities  that  does  not  add  to  their  market  value.  Their  magnitude  seems 
plausible, given the finding that bureaucratic costs alone amounted to 19 percent of Colombian 
per capita income in 2007 (World Bank, 2008).
 25  Fixed costs are estimated to be 26,279 1977 
Colombian pesos, or $1,595 current U.S. dollars These expenditures are incurred every year, 
regardless  of  production  levels;  they  include  various  overhead  expenses  like  insurance  and 
                                                 
24 In 1977, there were 46.11 pesos per dollar. Also the U.S. GDP deflator was about 36 percent of its value in 2007. 
We use these two statistics to translate 1977 Colombian pesos into current U.S. dollars. 
 
25 By way of crude comparison, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) report that in 1984 the median start-up equity investment 




We estimate non-asset household income (y) to be 4,058  in 1977 pesos, or $246 in 
current dollars, and we estimate the average initial wealth of a new entrepreneur (assuming a 
lognormal distribution) is estimated at  0 a  = 114,800 in 1977 pesos, or $6,970 in current dollars. 
The average initial wealth of new entrepreneurial households suggests that new entrepreneurs 
have to borrow in order to create a new business. However, since there is significant variation 
around  this  mean  (
0 a    =  43,158),  our  results  do  not  imply  that  those  who  actually  create 
businesses must leverage themselves heavily. With regard to household preferences toward risk, 
our estimate of the utility function parameter,  85 . 1 ˆ   , is within the ranges of values typically 
obtained from studies of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and coefficient of relative 
risk aversion.
26  
The estimated credit market imperfection index ( 97 . 0 ˆ   ) is close to unity, implying that 
creditors view themselves as unable to seize collateralized assets in the event of default. Put 
differently, creditors view households as capable of absconding with nearly the entire value of 
their firms’ productive assets if they choose to do so. One should bear in mind that, since θ is 
identified by the borrowing levels of firms at different (υ,k) combinations, it will tend toward 
unity whenever the data indicate that borrowing levels are low at small, highly profitable firms. 
Hence, although information asymmetries and costly state verification are not part of our model, 
they  may  well  help  explain  the  large  θ  value  that  we  estimate.  In  any  case,  our  finding  is 
consistent with the World Bank’s (2008) assessment that there are severe enforcement problems 
in Colombian credit markets (refer to footnote 8). Further, as the simulated moments indicate, 
                                                 
26 Estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which corresponds to 1/σ in our model, are typically 
found to be in the range of .5 to 1 when household data on consumption is used (e.g. Blundell, Browning and 
Meghir (1994),  Attanaiso,  Banks and Tanner (2002)).   24 
 
the model does a reasonably good job of explaining the borrowing patterns observed in the data. 
It predicts equilibrium borrowing at  = 0.97 because, by not defaulting, borrowers keep open 
the option of operating a business in the future without incurring entry costs.   
 
IV.  Industry Structure, Wealth Distributions and Credit Market Imperfections 
Given all of the parameter estimates discussed above, we can now use simulations to 
answer four basic questions.
 27 First, how might industry and household characteristics change if 
loan contracts were perfectly enforceable? Second, how do credit market imperfections affect 
industry and household characteristics during regime 1 (strong but volatile exchange rate and 
low interest rates) versus regime 2 (weak, relative stable exchange rate and high interest rates)? 
Third, how do the effects of credit market imperfections depend upon the overall volatility of the 
macro environment? And finally, how has the large spread between borrowing and lending rates 
affected industry and household characteristics?  
A.     Ability to Enforce Debt Contracts  
To  summarize  industry  characteristics  under  different  credit  market  conditions,  we 
generate 50 simulations of the model under the ― base case‖ assumption that  = 0.97, and 50 
simulations under the ― counterfactual‖ assumption that  = 0.
28 The former implies that lenders 
are almost completely unable to recoup any collateral from a defaulting borrower, while the 
                                                 
27 To perform these simulations, it is necessary to assume an initial distribution of potential entrant firms over asset 
levels,  ) ( it
N a h , and an initial distribution of incumbent owner-households over asset levels and productivity 
levels,  ) , ( it it
I a h  . We let the former be lognormal with the estimated parameter values reported in table 3, and 
we let the initial distribution of incumbents’ wealth distributed lognormally with mean 6 and variance 2.  Since we 
discard the first 30 years of simulated data, the results proved to be insensitive to the initial wealth distribution of 
incumbents. 
 
28 The same sets of draws for profit shocks (ν’s) and macro shocks (υ’s) are used in both sets of simulations, so the 
only source of difference between our base case and counterfactual results is the associated difference in  values . 
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latter implies they can seize a defaulting borrower’s collateral and sell it at its full market value. 
All simulations are for 130 periods. After discarding the first 30 periods of each (to eliminate 
atypical ―bur n-in‖ years), we construct cross-simulation average moments under each scenario.  
Table 4 summarizes the results. Note first that reducing   from 0.97 to 0.0 increases the 
average  log  debt-to-asset  (leverage)  ratio  among  borrowers  from  -0.79  to  -0.51,  or  taking 
antilogs, from .45 to .60. This extra borrowing reflects the expansion of firms owned by low-a, 
high-ν households toward the size at which the marginal return on business capital (k) matches 
the lending rate.  
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it it a a / , rises from 0.42 to 0.44 when   
drops from 0.97 to zero, indicating a 2 percentage point improvement in the return on the pooled 
wealth portfolios of entrepreneurial households (Table 4).
 29 These gains are concentrated among 
the low-a households, as evidenced by the dramatic increase in the unweighted average  value. 
In fact, since the median  value is unresponsive to improvements in contract enforceability, it 
appears that the return on wealth for the majority of entrepreneurs is unaffected.   
In  addition  to  increasing  income  among  low-a  owner-households,  perfect  contract 
enforceability affects the aggregate economy in several respects. First, it induces higher savings 
rates among the affected owner-households, causing the average log wealth level to rise from 
                                                 
29 The typical  value is above the interest rate, even when  =0, since operating profits must be large enough in 
expectation to finance entry costs. Further, since entry costs are the same for all households,  is typically larger 
among low-a entrepreneurial households, for whom the denominator of (11) is relatively small. 26 
 
8.58 to 8.64 and the average log capital stock to rise from 6.41 to 6.86. Second, by moving 
financial resources toward relatively high-return firms, it improves allocative efficiency. This is 
apparent  in  the  increased  covariance  between  size  and  profit  shocks  and  in  the  diminished 
correlation between wealth and firm size.  
Finally, as θ  drops from  0.97 to  0.0, more  low-a  potential owner households  find it 
worthwhile to open businesses, and more low-a owner-entrepreneurs find it worthwhile to stay in 
business. These adjustments are reflected in the number of active firms, which increases from 
966 to 1227, in the average life span of firms, which rises from 9.03 years to 9.10 years, in the 
average ν among owner-entrepreneurs, which falls from 0.90 to 0.80, and in the average profit 
shock among exiting firms, which falls from -0.16 to -0.21.  
B.  Loan enforcement effects under alternative Colombian macro regimes  
Next we investigate whether the effects of credit market imperfections are similar during 
the different macro  regimes identified by our switching VAR. We do this by  generating 50 
simulations of our model, each for 130 periods, discarding the initial 30 periods as a burn-in. 
Then we average values of the various statistics for all periods during which regime 1 prevailed, 
and for all periods when regime 2 prevailed. Households are presumed to correctly perceive that 
switching patterns are governed by the estimated switching threshold of r  =  0.125. 
  The first two columns of table 5 summarize the regime 1 and regime 2 results for the base 
case of θ = 0.97 and the last two columns do the same for the counterfactual case of θ = 0. Note 
that the average log exchange rate and interest rate are 4.70 and 0.09, respectively, in regime 1, 
while they are 4.59 and 0.16, respectively, in regime 2. Thus interest rates and exchange rates 
move in opposite directions when regimes change, and their effects on businesses’ net earnings 
after interest work in opposite directions. Nonetheless, on average  entrepreneurs earn higher 27 
 
returns  on  their  wealth  under  the  strong  exchange  rates  and  low  interest  rates  of  regime  1. 
Further, since the payoff to low interest rates depends upon firms’ ability to borrow, the effects 
of regime switches are highly dependent upon contract enforceability. The difference between 
weighted average earnings rates on portfolios under the two regimes is only 3 percentage points 
when  credit  markets  function  poorly  (=0.97),  but  when  contracts  are  perfectly  enforceable 
(=0) it is 17 percentage points.    
  Figure 3a depicts the percentage  changes in welfare for different types of incumbent 
owner-households as the economy moves from regime 2 to regime 1, presuming that θ = 0.97.  
Clearly the net gains from switching to regime 2 tend to fall with productivity and rise with 
household  wealth.  This  pattern  reflects  the  fact  that  regime  1’s  high  interest  rates  help 
households  that  are  net  depositors,  while  regime  2’s  favorable  exchange  rates  increase  the 
operating profits of business owners.   Since low- households don’t hold much of their wealth 
in businesses and are relatively likely to trade their businesses for bank deposits in the future, 
their primary concern is with deposit rates.  High wealth households likewise hold relatively 
large fractions of their wealth in banks and do well when deposit rates are high.  
Among incumbents who are more dependent upon business income—that is, low-a, high-
 entrepreneurs—several more effects come into in play. First, these entrepreneurs dislike the 
extra exchange-rate-induced volatility in operating profits that comes  with regime 1. This is 
particularly true for incumbents with low wealth, who are relatively risk-averse. Second, at any 
given wealth level, high-ν incumbents are less bothered by low interest rates because they hold a 
relatively large share of their assets in the form of business investments. In fact, low-a, high-ν 
households tend to be debtors, so they welcome the lower lending rates that regime 1 brings. The 28 
 
interaction of these effects makes the welfare effects of regime switches non-monotonic in ν at 
low a values.  
Figure 3b shows how the surface in figure 3a would shift if contract enforceability were 
perfect (θ=0).  High-a, low- households are not affected by θ because these households self-
finance their capital investments and are not credit constrained when contract enforcement is 
weak.  However,  improvements  in  enforcement  do  help  low-a,  high-ν  households  in  periods 
when they would like to be borrowing more, i.e., when regime 1 prevails.
30  This enforcement-
induced shift in the value of low-a, high-ν households is associated with more regime-1 business 
investment by households with modest wealth, and it is the reason that cov(a,k) is higher under 
regime 2 than under regime 1 when θ = 0 (Table 5).
  
C.  Contract Enforcement and the Macro Environment: Argentina versus Colombia 
  Results  in  the  previous  section  suggest  that  the  effects  of  improved  contract 
enforceability  depend  partly  upon  the  degree  of  macro  volatility.  To  further  explore  this 
relationship, we now ask how changes in θ would have affected Colombian households if they 
had been somehow transplanted to the relatively volatile Argentine macro environment.  
Figure 4 shows the evolution of Argentine real exchange rates and real interest rates over 
the past 30 years. Juxtaposed with figure 1, it demonstrates that this country’s recent macro 
history  has  been  much  more  turbulent  than  Colombia’s.  This  impression  is  confirmed  by 
estimates  of  our  SETAR  switching  model  based  on  Argentine  time  series  (Table  7).  We 
decisively reject a single regime, and we estimate a covariance matrix for the innovations in the 
process that is roughly 10 larger than Colombia’s (compare Table 7 to Table 1). 
                                                 
30 This finding is similar to Gine and Townsend’s (2004), whose simulations imply that the primary beneficiaries of 
improvements in the Thai financial sector are ― talented would-be entrepreneurs who lack credit and cannot 
otherwise go into business (or invest little capital).‖ (p. 269)  29 
 
  Table  7  repeats  the  counterfactual  experiment  that  generated  Table  4,  replacing  the 
Colombian transition density for st  from Table 1 with the Argentine transition density from Table 
6. All other parameters are left unchanged. In a number of respects, we find that well-functioning 
credit markets are more important when interest rates and exchange rates are volatile. Compared 
to the findings for the Colombian macro environment, Argentine macro conditions induce larger 
responses to perfect enforcement in terms of leverage rates, average firm life spans, average 
portfolio returns, average log firm sizes, and average log wealth levels. The reason is that with 
relatively dramatic macro shocks, households have stronger incentives to create or expand firms 
during good times and to contract or shut them down during bad times. Well-functioning credit 
markets allow them to do this. 
Surprisingly,  while  the  weighted  average  return  on  portfolios  rises  in  response  to 
improved contract enforcement in the Colombian macro environment (Table 4), it drops when 
Argentine macro conditions are assumed (Table 7). What might explain this contrast? When 
improvements in contract enforceability make it easier to finance entry and expansion, more 
firms avail themselves of the temporary profit opportunities created by the volatile Argentine 
macro environment. Accordingly, marginally profitable firms are more numerous when θ = 0 
than when θ = 0.97, and the weighted-average return on portfolios falls.  This interpretation is 
supported by the large drop in average profit shocks and average life expectancy of firms.   
 
D.  The Effects of the Borrowing/Lending Spread  
  As a final exercise, we explore the effects of more efficient financial intermediation in a 
different sense: lower spreads between borrowing and lending rates, μ. For non-entrepreneurial 
households, it can be seen from (1) that the first order effect of a small reduction in μ is to raise 30 
 
the value of current income by an amount proportional to the household’s asset holdings, a.  For 
owner-households with bank deposits, (4) show that a reduction in μ has the first order effect of 
reducing consumption by an amount that is proportional to       . For owner-households with 
debt, (4) shows that the reduction in the spread has no effect on income—all of the household’s 
assets are invested in the firm and receiving a return of r.  Thus, one of the effects of reducing 
the spread should be to make exit more attractive for incumbent firms by raising the return on 
assets  held  by  non-entrepreneurial  households.    This  should  raise  the  threshold  value  of  ν 
required for a firm to remain in the industry, with this effect more pronounced for  wealthy 
households.   
  To  examine  the  impact  of  a  reduction  in  μ  on  the  Colombian  apparel  industry,  we 
simulate our model forward under a base case scenario (μ=0.06) and a counterfactual scenario 
(μ=0.02). The reduction in spreads induces different savings patterns, and the associated changes 
in wealth trajectories generate a gradual change in industry structure, so for this exercise we go 
beyond before/after comparisons to explore transition dynamics. More precisely, we simulate the 
first 50 periods with μ=0.06 and an additional 50 periods with μ=0.02, discarding an initial burn-
in period of 30 years. We assume that the reduction in spread is unanticipated, but once it has 
occurred, households correctly understand that the reduction is permanent.  
  Figure 5a shows the adjustment in the number of firms that takes place after the spread 
reduction in period 50. The higher deposit rate attracts wealth out of proprietorships and into 
bank accounts, but the adjustment is gradual because it is accomplished mainly through reduced 
entry  rates  during  a  transition  period.  This  asymmetry  in  adjustment  margins  reflects  the 
presence of sunk entry costs, which induce some entrepreneurs to continuing operating firms 
after the jump in deposit rates, even though they would not have created their firms if they had 31 
 
known the change in μ was coming. The effect of higher deposit rates is more dramatic for the 
case of well-functioning credit markets (θ =0) because, as discussed in section IVA above, these 
credit conditions encourage exit among marginal firms.  
  As  entrepreneurs  move  their  wealth  out  of  low-return  establishments  and  into  bank 
deposits, the marginal product of business investment rises, driving up the average size-weighted 
profit shock (ν) by roughly 0.05 and the unweighted return on owner-household portfolios by 
0.08 (Table 8 and Figure 5b). Higher deposit rates drive down average firm size too, but only in 
the case of poorly functioning credit markets (Table 8 and figure 5c). The reason, once again, is 
that when credit markets function poorly, entrepreneurs have relatively strong incentives to avoid 
leaving and re-entering. Thus, when confronted with higher deposit rates, entrepreneurs with 
relatively unprofitable firms tend to scale them back rather than shut them down. 
  As  with  other  counterfactual  experiments,  the  effects  of  reforms  are  not  distributed 
evenly across different types of households. Figure 5d shows that the main adjustment in terms 
of portfolio reallocations toward bank deposits comes among high-productivity firms held by 
wealthy  households.  These  households  own  businesses,  and  not  being  credit-rationed,  they 
equate returns at the margin between their business investments and bank deposits before the 
reform. Accordingly, when the deposit rate rises, this group scales back its business investments 
most dramatically.    
 
V.  Summary   
  We have developed an empirical model that characterizes the effects of macroeconomic 
volatility, poorly functioning credit markets, and substantial entry costs. Applied to panel data on 
Colombian  apparel  producers,  the  model  has  yielded  econometric  estimates  of  a  loan 32 
 
enforcement index, the sunk costs of creating a new business, and various other parameters. It 
has also provided a basis for counter-factual experiments that explore the effects of improved 
contract enforcement and reduced spreads between borrowing and lending rates.  
  In  particular,  simulations  of  our  model  imply  that  perfect  loan  contract  enforcement 
substantially increases the ability of  entrepreneurial households to pursue profitable business 
investments.  Accordingly, the average return on asset portfolios increases dramatically and the 
number of active businesses rises. At the same time, firms’ sizes become less correlated with the 
wealth of their owners and more correlated with their capacity to generate operating profits. 
Further improvements in the return on portfolios come from reductions in the spread between 
borrowing and lending rates. 
  The effects of financial reforms on entrepreneurial households depend upon the market 
potential of their businesses, their wealth, and the macro environment. For example, the gains 
from reductions in the borrowing/lending spread accrue to households that are wealthy enough to 
hold  savings  deposits.  On  the  other  hand,  the  benefits  of  good  contract  enforcement  accrue 
mainly  to  households  with  good  business  ideas  but  modest  wealth.    Further,  as  the  macro 
environment swings from low interest rates and a strong but volatile currency to low interest 
rates and a weaker, more stable currency, the benefits of improved contract enforcement become 
larger still for these households.  
  Finally, the efficiency gains from improved enforceability are larger when the macro 
environment is volatile because well-functioning credit markets enhance entrepreneurs’ ability to 
quickly  adjust  their  firm  size,  and  the  returns  to  doing  so  are  relatively  large  when  market 
conditions are unstable. In particular, if the Colombian macro environment were replaced with 
the Argentine environment of the past 25 years, the effect of moving to perfect enforceability on 33 
 
average  leverage  rates,  average  portfolio  returns,  average  firm  size,  and  average  wealth  of 
entrepreneurs would be far more dramatic.   34 
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Appendix 1: The Profit Function Estimator 
A.      Sources of identification 
From (10c) in the text, the expectation of the profit shock  it   conditioned on the macro state, 
predetermined variables, and continuation ( 1  it  ) is: 
) 1 , , , | ( ) 1 , , , | ( 1 1 1        it it it t it it it it it t it a s E v a s E        
Thus, using (10a) – (10c), the following errors have mean zero and are orthogonal to the vector 
of conditioning variables: 
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and  the  associated  moment  conditions  provide  a  basis  for  identifying  the  profit  function 
parameters and the transition density,  ) | ( 1 it it f    :  
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we express the continuation probability as:   
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where  ()   is the standard normal density function and (from section IIIB),  ) , ( it t a s   is the 
minimum  profit  shock  at  which  a  firm  continues  operating.  Then,  given  Pit  ,  the  standard 
formulae for moments of truncated normal distributions imply (e.g., Maddala, 1983):   
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 is the relevant Mills ratio and Φ( ) is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function.  Parameterizing  ) , ( it t a s  as a flexible function in its arguments (with time 
dummies controlling for the macro state), then substituting A4 into A1 and A2 and substituting 
A5 into A3, one obtains moment expressions in terms of data and parameters.  
 
B.   Dealing with unobserved asset stocks 
To implement the estimation strategy sketched above, one must deal with several issues 
concerning ait . The first is that ait is never observed for the firms exiting in period t. (Refer to the 
time line in figure A1 below.)  This problem is easily surmounted because, given the macro state, 
st-1,  all  households  with  the  same  (ait-1,  vit-1)  values  make  the  same  capital  choices  and 
consumption decisions, and begin period t with the same ait.  Therefore, the vector (ait-1 vit-1, st-1) 
implies  (ait,  vit-1)  for  any  firm  that  is  not  rationed,  and  we  can  replace  the  latter  vector  of 
conditioning variables with the former.  





















The second problem is that the data set does not directly report ait values for any period. 
We deal with this problem in different ways for different types of firms. For all firms that carry 
positive debt (dit ), our model implies ait =  kit – dit  because no household has an incentive to 
simultaneously borrow and hold bank deposits. Thus when dit > 0, ait can be constructed as kit  -
dit.
31 Further, this is true even for firms with no debt, so long as their owners hold their entire 
wealth as  physical  capital,  which occurs  when  a firm’s  marginal revenue product  of capital 
exceeds the deposit rate:  
                   1
1 0 2
2 ln exp ) 1 ( it it t it k e MRP  >  d
t r   ,    (A6)   
We check this condition, observation by observation, to identify those instances where we can 
assume ait =  kit . 
Finally, for observations where dit = 0 and (A6) fails to hold, ait cannot be inferred as kit . 
But kit-1 helps to predict exit thresholds among these firms, since it bounds assets from below (ait-
                                                 
31 Since dit  does not appear directly in equations A1-A3, its presence in the continuation probit provides a basis for 
identification of the parameters of interest.  
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1  >  kit-1)  and  therefore  contains  information  about  their  owners’  willingness  to  continue 
operating  proprietorships.  We  therefore  express  these  firms’  threshold  profit  shocks  as 
  it it t k s      1 , ~ , where    1 , ~
 it t k s   is the projection of    it t a s ,   on a flexible function of  
  1 ,  it t k s , and  it   is the noise in this projection. That is, when (A6) fails to hold and a firm 
holds no debt, we write the continuation probability as: 
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Then, further assuming that  it   is normally distributed, (A4) and (A5) generalize to: 
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 is the value of  it   at which 
equation (A6) holds with equality.   
In sum, our estimator sorts firms according to whether assets can be inferred or not—i.e., 
whether the conditions  dit = 0 and νit  ≤  b(kit, st) hold. For observations where these conditions 42 
 
apply, we use (A4’) and (A5’) in the calculation of the sample moments rather than (A4) and 
(A5). At the estimated parameter vector, only 16 percent of the sample fell in this category. (That 
is, 84 percent of the observations were on firms with positive debt levels, rationing, or both.)  
Also, 24 percent of the observations were found to be rationed.      Table 1:  SETAR Switching Model Parameters
a 
    Regime 1    Regime 2 
  e  r  e  r 



























  2.06e-3  -4.56e-5  1.55e-3  -1.58e-4 
-4.56e-5  4.79e-4  -1.58e-4  3.26e-4 
Threshold r  0.125   
χ 
2 (8) test statistic for single regime:  17.48   
 




Table 2:  Operating Profit Function Parameters, Colombian Apparel Producers
* 
 
  Parameter  Std. Error  Z-ratio 
Intercept, revenue equation (0)  5.842  0.317  18.423 
Intercept, cost equation (0  + ln)  5.624  0.317  17.729 
Exchange rate (1)  -0.357  0.050  -7.124 
Capital stock (2)  0.629  0.033  19.010 
       
Root of   process ()  0.893  0.008  111.878 
Variance of innovation in process ( 2
  )  0.418  0.011  38.811 
Depreciation rate (δ)
**  0.093  0.004  23.650 
       
Number of observations  10,340 
 
*GMM estimates of the system (11a), (11b), (11c), (11d). 
**Estimated separately as the average (book value) depreciation rate. Table 3: 
Parameters Identified by the Dynamic Programming Problem () 
  Parameter  Std. Error  Z ratio 
Exogenous income (y)  4.058  8.948   0.454 
Fixed costs  (f)  26.269  7.2460   3.625 
Sunk entry costs (F)  168.713  53.140   3.175 
Credit market imperfection index ()  0.970  0.024  40.417 
Risk aversion parameter (σ)  1.850  0.165  11.212 
Average log assets, new entrepreneurs ( 0 a )  114.800  21.188   5.418 
Variance in log assets, new entrepreneurs ( 2
0 a  )  1862.696  611.764   3.045 
Probability of new business opportunity (p)  0.104  0.012   8.667 
Ratio of total productive assets to fixed assets ()  7.086  0.038  186.474 






Mean, log capital  6.548  6.193 
Variance, of log capital  1.437  2.102 
Mean, log capital, entrants  5.877  5.947 
Variance, of log capital, entrants  0.989  1.705 
Mean, log operating profits  7.286  6.801 
Variance, log operating profits  1.700  2.048 
Mean, log debt (given debt is positive)  -0.819  -0.878 
Variance, log debt (given debt is positive)  0.370  2.449 
Mean, growth in net capital stock  0.074  -0.067 
Variance, growth in net capital stock  0.240  0.208 
Mean, entry rate  0.102  0.147 
Mean, exit rate  0.101  0.156 
Variance, entry rate  0.000  0.007 
Variance, exit rate  0.001  0.003 
Covariance, log capital, log operating profits  1.475  1.143 
Covariance, log capital, lagged log operating 
profits 
1.265  1.948 
Covariance, log debt, log capital  -0.149  -0.201 
Covariance, log debt, log operating profits  0.011  0.400 
Covariance, net capital growth, log operating 
profits 
0.085  0.061 
Covariance,  log capital, net capital growth  0.151  0.199 
Covariance, log debt, lagged log capital  -0.239  0.308 
Covariance, log debt, lagged log operating profits  -0.146  -0.151 
Covariance, log capital, lagged operating profits  1.312  1.174 
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Table 4: Industry Characteristics and Loan Enforcement 
 
   = 0.97  θ = 0 
Number of firms  966.33  1227.11 
Entry/exit rate  0.10  0.10 
Mean age of active firms  9.03  9.10 
Mean profitability (ν)  0.90  0.80 
Mean log capital (k)  6.41  6.86 
Mean log(k)-weighted profitability  0.99  0.94 
Mean  ν of exiting firms  -0.15  -0.28 
Mean portfolio return ()  2.09  3.38 
Median portfolio return ()  0.45  0.45 
Mean log(a)-weighted portfolio return  0.42  0.44 
Covariance,  υ and log(k)  0.09  0.13 
Mean log leverage among borrowers  -0.79  -0.51 
Log of mean wealth of firm owners  8.58  8.64 
Correlation, wealth and capital  0.85  0.51 
 
 
Table 5: Loan Enforcement, Macro Conditions and Industry Characteristics 
 
   = 0.97   = 0 
  Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 1  Regime 2 
Number of Firms  968.27  965.33  1237.98  1221.51 
Entry rate  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.10 
Exit rate  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10 
Mean profit shock (ν)  0.90  0.90  0.80  0.81 
Mean log(k)-weighted profit shock  0.99  0.99  0.93  0.94 
Covariance,  υ and log(k)  0.09  0.09  0.13  0.13 
Mean portfolio return ()  2.29  1.99  4.51  2.79 
Median portfolio return ()  0.48  0.44  0.56  0.39 
Mean log(a)-weighted portfolio return  0.44  0.41  0.55  0.38 
Mean log capital  6.43  6.40  6.95  6.81 
Mean log leverage among borrowers  -0.78  -0.80  -0.50  -0.51 
Log of mean wealth of firm owners  8.58  8.58  8.65  8.64 
Correlation, log wealth and log capital  0.84  0.85  0.40  0.56 
Mean ν of exiting firms  -0.15  -0.15  -0.23  -0.23 
Mean Exchange Rate  4.71  4.53  4.71  4.53 
Variance Exchange Rate  0.08  0.05  0.08  0.05 
Mean Interest Rate  0.08  0.16  0.08  0.16 
Variance Interest Rate  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 46 
 
Table 6:  SETAR Switching Model Parameters, Argentina
a 
  Regime 1  Regime 2 
  e  r  e  r 



























  0.0407  0.0337  0.0045  0.0004 
0.0337  0.5152  0.0004  0.0397 
Threshold r  0.034   
χ 
2 (8) test statistic for single regime:  184.28   
 
aBased on quarterly IFS data for Argentina, 1980-I through 2008-IV. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
Table 7: Industry Characteristics and Loan Enforcement 
in an Argentine Macro Environment 
 
   = 0.97  θ = 0 
Number of firms  1103.38  1373.67 
Entry/Exit rate  0.10  0.11 
Mean age of active firms  9.00  7.47 
Mean profit shock (ν)  0.81  0.67 
Mean log capital (k)  6.54  7.47 
Mean log(k)-weighted ν  0.93  0.83 
Mean  ν of exiting firms  -0.22  -0.29 
Mean portfolio return ()  4.94  13.10 
Median portfolio return ()  0.49  0.56 
Mean log(a)-weighted portfolio return  0.45  0.20 
Covariance,  υ and log(k)  0.11  0.16 
Mean log leverage among borrowers  -0.89  -0.43 
Mean log(a) of firm owners  9.26  9.67 
Correlation, wealth and capital  0.81  0.52 
Mean exchange rate  4.11  4.11 






Table 8: Loan Enforcement, Interest Rate Spreads and Industry Characteristics 
 
   = 0.97   = 0 
  μ=0.06  μ=0.02  μ=0.06  μ=0.02 
Number of Firms  1010.81  880.30  1183.61  1144.42 
Entry rate  0.10  0.11  0.10  0.11 
Exit rate  0.10  0.12  0.10  0.11 
Mean profit shock (ν)  0.89  0.95  0.81  0.84 
Mean log capital (k)  6.56  6.47  7.02  7.01 
Mean k-weighted profit shock  0.97  1.02  0.94  0.96 
Covariance, (υ,k)  0.08  0.08  0.13  0.12 
Mean Portfolio Return  2.02  2.10  3.37  3.62 
Weighted Mean Portfolio Return  0.40  0.43  0.45  0.54 
Mean log capital  6.56  6.47  7.02  7.01 
Log of mean wealth (a) of firm owners  8.68  8.62  8.71  8.51 
Correlation, log wealth and log capital  0.86  0.87  0.50  0.43 





Figure 1: Transitions between household types 












Source: International Monetary Fund, IFS Statistics, and calculations of the authors. An 
increase in the exchange rate corresponds to an appreciation. 
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Figure 3a: Percentage Differences in Welfare of an Incumbent Firm Owner, 
regime 1 – regime 2 (θ=0.97) 
 
Figure 3b: Change in 4a when θ=0.97 is reduced to θ=0 
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Figure 4: Argentina Exchange Rates and Interest Rates 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, IFS Statistics, and calculations of the authors. An 
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Figure 5a: Changes in the Spread and the Number of Firms 
 
Figure 5b: Changes in Spread and Average Profit Shock 
 
   






































Figure 5c: Changes in Spread and Average Firm Size 
 
 
Figure 5d: Changes in Spread and Average Firm Size 
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